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GrapheneOS offers a load of advanced privacy features, making it one of the most privacy- respecting mobile OS available. GrapheneOS is most effective when tailored to your threat model(casual trackers vs state surveillance) This guide is tailored to more moderately advanced threat models,but I did include "Optional" steps that are not recommended/needed for more advanced threat models.
Installing GrapheneOS
1.Pick a model of jewgle pixel. Pixel 6(supported till 2026) Or newer models are supported longer Pixel 9 Pro (supported till 2031) . Purchase a used one with cash/crypto. Must be carrier unlocked
2.degoogling and installing graphene os. follow instructions on their official website https://grapheneos.org/install/
3.Skip Network: You can connect later or when in a secure enviroment
4.Turn off location and Turn on Airplane mode.
5.Password protect your device with a strong password you can memorize
6.Set up a duress password this will be used in emergency situations. When entered it will wipe your device.
7.Set MAC address randomization to per connection in Wifi settings
8.Set Auto reboot to 10 hours or less so your device reverts to a locked encrypted state after inactivity
9.Set up separate profiles from the owner account. You can compartmentalize different environments in these profiles leaving the owner profile for admin management and appearances.
10.Familiarize yourself with grapheneOS features by reading through the FAQ
Initial Setup
Set auto-reboot to 4-12 hours maximum in Security settings (the owner profile controls this for all profiles). The default 18 hours leaves data decrypted in RAM too long if you become separated from the phone. Frequent full reboots return the device to an at-rest state and are not easily bypassed.
Set USB-C port control to charging-only (avoid the "when locked" option). This disables data lines and alternate modes at the hardware level before the OS boots, mitigating charging-based attacks, the stock toggle is weaker.
In Security > More security & privacy, disable "grant sensors permission to new apps" globally, and repeat for every profile. Apps will receive zeroed or fake sensor data instead,auto-rotate still functions. Sensors leak movement and orientation data that many users overlook.
During each app install, deny network permission in the install dialog unless the app strictly needs Internet access. This blocks localhost traffic between profiles as well and drasticallyreduces attack surface from malicious apps.
Tip :GrapheneOS enforces this more strictly than stock: apps simply see "no network" without crashing scheduled jobs.
For any secondary profile or Private Space you are not actively using, use the lock screen or power menu "End session" action. This removes encryption keys from RAM and the secure element immediately. No reboot is required as with the owner profile, data returns to an at-rest state without affecting the primary profile.
Enable a duress PIN/password in Security. Entering it at the lock screen triggers a wipe and immediate power-off with no recovery (including eSIMs). Choose a short, plausible-looking code you will not enter or fat finger accidentally.
Enable PIN scrambling for all unlock factors, including SIM PINs. Randomizing keypad layout defeats shoulder-surfing and smudge attacks (for example, public spaces with cameras or bystanders), (skin walkers).
Set WiFi and Bluetooth auto-disable timers to two minutes in the owner profile (this applies to all profiles). Use LTE-only mode in mobile network settings to reduce cellular radio attack surface.
In every non-owner profile, disable "allow installing apps" under Users & profiles. Install via the owner profile and push apps with "Install available apps." This minimizes daily attack surface and prevents unauthorized sideloads.
These steps separate users who read documentation from those who stay safe long-term. Treat the device as if it could be physically seized or remotely accessed at any time
Every user profile inherits the owner profile’s time zone. Apps can read this and use it for fingerprinting.
With a physical SIM and Airplane Mode off, apps can detect your carrier and region.
Physical access allows viewing apps installed in secondary profiles from the owner profile. Private Space mitigates this, enable it in Security
Don’t run risky or illegal software on the owner profile.
Favor the browser instead of installing apps when possible to avoid 'hard', device finger printing, Use KeePassXC, clear cookies and site data on exit, and avoid storing unencrypted files on the device.
Network & Privacy:
Private DNS: Settings > Network & internet > Private DNS > Set to one.one.one.one (Cloudflare) or dns.quad9.net for encrypted DNS.
Disable connectivity checks (optional, for maximum privacy): Settings > Network & internet > Internet connectivity check > Off. Note: May break captive portal detection.
Wi-Fi MAC randomization: Enabled by default per-connection. Verify in Wi-Fi network settings > Privacy.
Location: Use only when needed. Disable network-based location unless required.
GrapheneOS's implementation proxies to Apple/Google but doesn't send precise location by default
App & Permission Hardening:
Network permission: Revoke INTERNET permission for apps that don't need it. GrapheneOS shows this toggle during install and in App info.
Storage Scopes: Instead of granting full storage access, use Storage Scopes (Settings > Privacy Storage Scopes) to grant access to specific folders.
Contact Scopes: Same concept for contacts, grant access to specific contacts, not the entire address book.
Disable WebView JIT for apps: In Developer options (if enabled), disable WebView JIT compilation globally, or per-app via Vanadium settings. Sandboxed Google Play (if needed):
Install "Sandboxed Google Play" from GrapheneOS app repository
Install only in a secondary user profile to isolate from main data
Grants Play Services functionality without privileged access
Vanadium browser hardening:
Enable content filtering (EasyList/EasyPrivacy) in Vanadium settings
Disable JavaScript JIT by default (per-site enable as needed)
Enable strict site isolation Auditor app: Install from GrapheneOS repository. Use for local/remote attestation to detect tampering.
Duress PIN: Settings > Security & privacy > Device unlock > Duress Password. Enter this to wipe device under coercion
User profile Setup Part two
It is important to remember that all apps on Android are sandboxed, regardless of which profile they’re installed in. For most use-cases, using secondary user profiles to further isolate apps is unnecessary. However, isolating apps to different profiles does have a few advantages, some of which are listed below:
Apps cannot communicate with apps in other profiles via inter-process communication (IPC).
Apps cannot discover which apps are installed in other user profiles.
In cases where apps don’t support multiple logins, profiles can be used to get around this kind of limitation.
All profiles have their own unique encryption keys, even if they share the same PIN or password.
It’s possible to end secondary user profiles’ sessions, putting their data at rest (a reboot is necessary to put the owner profile’s data to rest). This also stops apps from running in the background. The owner profile can control secondary user profiles’ access to: continue running while other profiles are in the foreground, phone calls and SMS, and installing apps.
Each profile has its own set of contacts, files and media directories. Apps in different profiles, which have been granted the necessary permissions, can only access data from that profile. The Storage and Contact Scopes features in GrapheneOS allow users to choose exactly what contacts, files and media any app can access, providing a more convenient way of achieving isolation of these data types.
Each profile has its own VPN setup, so even if two profiles are running at the same time, they can use servers in different countries, using different VPN providers, or even no VPN at all.
In some rare cases, some apps will not work when used in a secondary user profile and will
require you to use them in your owner profile.
There is no single “best” profile setup. Each individual person has their own specific needs and use their devices in their own way. It’s impossible for anyone to say one setup is the best because it’s entirely subjective.
Although user profiles have some security and privacy benefits, their primary purpose is to allow multiple people to use a single device. This means that each person can customize their own profile as they please. Profiles also allow a single person to group apps and data on a “per-persona” basis. For example, some may choose to have separate user profiles for their employment, social media, games, etc.
Some Common Setups
Isolated Google Apps
One of the most common profile setups discussed within the GrapheneOS community is one where the user’s main profile – often the user’s owner profile – has only open source apps, and another profile with Sandboxed Google Play installed along with any other apps that rely on Google Play, such as banking apps, social media apps, etc.
Empty Owner Profile
Many GrapheneOS users choose to keep their owner profile almost completely empty, then use
a secondary user profile as their main profile. One advantage to this setup is that if a secondary user profile needs to be deleted for any
reason, it’s easy to do so, either from within the specific profile itself, or from the owner profile. There’s no need to do a factory reset, and any other profiles that might be on the device won’tbe affected.
Another advantage is that the owner profile can set many global or other “dangerous” settings (like enabling ADB, or adjusting USB-C settings, for example). By regularly using a profile other than the owner profile, these settings are harder to access. However, keep in mind that even if the owner profile is unlocked the owner profile’s PIN or password must be entered to change most “dangerous” settings.
Owner as an App Pusher
Some users who tend to use profiles a lot like to set up their owner profile to push apps to other profiles. Some install Sandboxed Google Play in their owner profile, but not in other profiles so they can push apps to profiles where Sandboxed Google Play is not installed. And since GrapheneOS allows users to disable user installed apps, users can disable Google Play and Google Play Services when not in use. You can only push apps to other profiles from the owner profile. You can do so from Settings >
System > Users > Profile > Install available apps.
No Secondary User Profiles
One option that many never even consider is not using secondary user profiles at all. Using profiles can add some unnecessary annoyances for some people because of how notifications work or switching between profiles is annoying, or PINs / passwords are too long or annoying.
Keep in mind that all apps are sandboxed, so for many threat models, profiles aren’t even necessary. So, for some users, a no profiles setup may actually be the best fit for them.
There is also the option to use the Private Space feature as an alternative to using a secondary user profile. This is a special type of profile nested under the owner profile. Apps in the Private Space and owner profile can be accessed simultaneously. Note that, currently, there’s a limit of one Private Space and it can only be in the owner profile. Also, the clipboard is shared between the owner profile and the Private Space, which is a significant vector for data to leak if not operated carefully.
For users who want an additional nested profile, it’s possible to also use a work profile managed by apps like Insular or Island. Private Space and work profiles are very similar, butPrivate Space has better OS integration and isolation, so Private Space is recommended by GrapheneOS over work profiles if possible.
A few app stores instead of GP
F-Droid:
1.Download from the official website.This will be used to download most of the recommended
apps
Obtanium:
2.Download from F-Droid. This will be used to download apps we cant find on F-Droid
Aurora Store:(Optional)
3 .Download from F-Droid. This is an privacy focused alternative to Googleplaystore. Only use if
necessary
Installing GrapheneOS
1.Pick a model of jewgle pixel. Pixel 6(supported till 2026) Or newer models are supported longer Pixel 9 Pro (supported till 2031) . Purchase a used one with cash/crypto. Must be carrier unlocked
2.degoogling and installing graphene os. follow instructions on their official website https://grapheneos.org/install/
3.Skip Network: You can connect later or when in a secure enviroment
4.Turn off location and Turn on Airplane mode.
5.Password protect your device with a strong password you can memorize
6.Set up a duress password this will be used in emergency situations. When entered it will wipe your device.
7.Set MAC address randomization to per connection in Wifi settings
8.Set Auto reboot to 10 hours or less so your device reverts to a locked encrypted state after inactivity
9.Set up separate profiles from the owner account. You can compartmentalize different environments in these profiles leaving the owner profile for admin management and appearances.
10.Familiarize yourself with grapheneOS features by reading through the FAQ
Initial Setup
Set auto-reboot to 4-12 hours maximum in Security settings (the owner profile controls this for all profiles). The default 18 hours leaves data decrypted in RAM too long if you become separated from the phone. Frequent full reboots return the device to an at-rest state and are not easily bypassed.
Set USB-C port control to charging-only (avoid the "when locked" option). This disables data lines and alternate modes at the hardware level before the OS boots, mitigating charging-based attacks, the stock toggle is weaker.
In Security > More security & privacy, disable "grant sensors permission to new apps" globally, and repeat for every profile. Apps will receive zeroed or fake sensor data instead,auto-rotate still functions. Sensors leak movement and orientation data that many users overlook.
During each app install, deny network permission in the install dialog unless the app strictly needs Internet access. This blocks localhost traffic between profiles as well and drasticallyreduces attack surface from malicious apps.
Tip :GrapheneOS enforces this more strictly than stock: apps simply see "no network" without crashing scheduled jobs.
For any secondary profile or Private Space you are not actively using, use the lock screen or power menu "End session" action. This removes encryption keys from RAM and the secure element immediately. No reboot is required as with the owner profile, data returns to an at-rest state without affecting the primary profile.
Enable a duress PIN/password in Security. Entering it at the lock screen triggers a wipe and immediate power-off with no recovery (including eSIMs). Choose a short, plausible-looking code you will not enter or fat finger accidentally.
Enable PIN scrambling for all unlock factors, including SIM PINs. Randomizing keypad layout defeats shoulder-surfing and smudge attacks (for example, public spaces with cameras or bystanders), (skin walkers).
Set WiFi and Bluetooth auto-disable timers to two minutes in the owner profile (this applies to all profiles). Use LTE-only mode in mobile network settings to reduce cellular radio attack surface.
In every non-owner profile, disable "allow installing apps" under Users & profiles. Install via the owner profile and push apps with "Install available apps." This minimizes daily attack surface and prevents unauthorized sideloads.
These steps separate users who read documentation from those who stay safe long-term. Treat the device as if it could be physically seized or remotely accessed at any time
Every user profile inherits the owner profile’s time zone. Apps can read this and use it for fingerprinting.
With a physical SIM and Airplane Mode off, apps can detect your carrier and region.
Physical access allows viewing apps installed in secondary profiles from the owner profile. Private Space mitigates this, enable it in Security
Don’t run risky or illegal software on the owner profile.
Favor the browser instead of installing apps when possible to avoid 'hard', device finger printing, Use KeePassXC, clear cookies and site data on exit, and avoid storing unencrypted files on the device.
Network & Privacy:
Private DNS: Settings > Network & internet > Private DNS > Set to one.one.one.one (Cloudflare) or dns.quad9.net for encrypted DNS.
Disable connectivity checks (optional, for maximum privacy): Settings > Network & internet > Internet connectivity check > Off. Note: May break captive portal detection.
Wi-Fi MAC randomization: Enabled by default per-connection. Verify in Wi-Fi network settings > Privacy.
Location: Use only when needed. Disable network-based location unless required.
GrapheneOS's implementation proxies to Apple/Google but doesn't send precise location by default
App & Permission Hardening:
Network permission: Revoke INTERNET permission for apps that don't need it. GrapheneOS shows this toggle during install and in App info.
Storage Scopes: Instead of granting full storage access, use Storage Scopes (Settings > Privacy Storage Scopes) to grant access to specific folders.
Contact Scopes: Same concept for contacts, grant access to specific contacts, not the entire address book.
Disable WebView JIT for apps: In Developer options (if enabled), disable WebView JIT compilation globally, or per-app via Vanadium settings. Sandboxed Google Play (if needed):
Install "Sandboxed Google Play" from GrapheneOS app repository
Install only in a secondary user profile to isolate from main data
Grants Play Services functionality without privileged access
Vanadium browser hardening:
Enable content filtering (EasyList/EasyPrivacy) in Vanadium settings
Disable JavaScript JIT by default (per-site enable as needed)
Enable strict site isolation Auditor app: Install from GrapheneOS repository. Use for local/remote attestation to detect tampering.
Duress PIN: Settings > Security & privacy > Device unlock > Duress Password. Enter this to wipe device under coercion
User profile Setup Part two
It is important to remember that all apps on Android are sandboxed, regardless of which profile they’re installed in. For most use-cases, using secondary user profiles to further isolate apps is unnecessary. However, isolating apps to different profiles does have a few advantages, some of which are listed below:
Apps cannot communicate with apps in other profiles via inter-process communication (IPC).
Apps cannot discover which apps are installed in other user profiles.
In cases where apps don’t support multiple logins, profiles can be used to get around this kind of limitation.
All profiles have their own unique encryption keys, even if they share the same PIN or password.
It’s possible to end secondary user profiles’ sessions, putting their data at rest (a reboot is necessary to put the owner profile’s data to rest). This also stops apps from running in the background. The owner profile can control secondary user profiles’ access to: continue running while other profiles are in the foreground, phone calls and SMS, and installing apps.
Each profile has its own set of contacts, files and media directories. Apps in different profiles, which have been granted the necessary permissions, can only access data from that profile. The Storage and Contact Scopes features in GrapheneOS allow users to choose exactly what contacts, files and media any app can access, providing a more convenient way of achieving isolation of these data types.
Each profile has its own VPN setup, so even if two profiles are running at the same time, they can use servers in different countries, using different VPN providers, or even no VPN at all.
In some rare cases, some apps will not work when used in a secondary user profile and will
require you to use them in your owner profile.
There is no single “best” profile setup. Each individual person has their own specific needs and use their devices in their own way. It’s impossible for anyone to say one setup is the best because it’s entirely subjective.
Although user profiles have some security and privacy benefits, their primary purpose is to allow multiple people to use a single device. This means that each person can customize their own profile as they please. Profiles also allow a single person to group apps and data on a “per-persona” basis. For example, some may choose to have separate user profiles for their employment, social media, games, etc.
Some Common Setups
Isolated Google Apps
One of the most common profile setups discussed within the GrapheneOS community is one where the user’s main profile – often the user’s owner profile – has only open source apps, and another profile with Sandboxed Google Play installed along with any other apps that rely on Google Play, such as banking apps, social media apps, etc.
Empty Owner Profile
Many GrapheneOS users choose to keep their owner profile almost completely empty, then use
a secondary user profile as their main profile. One advantage to this setup is that if a secondary user profile needs to be deleted for any
reason, it’s easy to do so, either from within the specific profile itself, or from the owner profile. There’s no need to do a factory reset, and any other profiles that might be on the device won’tbe affected.
Another advantage is that the owner profile can set many global or other “dangerous” settings (like enabling ADB, or adjusting USB-C settings, for example). By regularly using a profile other than the owner profile, these settings are harder to access. However, keep in mind that even if the owner profile is unlocked the owner profile’s PIN or password must be entered to change most “dangerous” settings.
Owner as an App Pusher
Some users who tend to use profiles a lot like to set up their owner profile to push apps to other profiles. Some install Sandboxed Google Play in their owner profile, but not in other profiles so they can push apps to profiles where Sandboxed Google Play is not installed. And since GrapheneOS allows users to disable user installed apps, users can disable Google Play and Google Play Services when not in use. You can only push apps to other profiles from the owner profile. You can do so from Settings >
System > Users > Profile > Install available apps.
No Secondary User Profiles
One option that many never even consider is not using secondary user profiles at all. Using profiles can add some unnecessary annoyances for some people because of how notifications work or switching between profiles is annoying, or PINs / passwords are too long or annoying.
Keep in mind that all apps are sandboxed, so for many threat models, profiles aren’t even necessary. So, for some users, a no profiles setup may actually be the best fit for them.
There is also the option to use the Private Space feature as an alternative to using a secondary user profile. This is a special type of profile nested under the owner profile. Apps in the Private Space and owner profile can be accessed simultaneously. Note that, currently, there’s a limit of one Private Space and it can only be in the owner profile. Also, the clipboard is shared between the owner profile and the Private Space, which is a significant vector for data to leak if not operated carefully.
For users who want an additional nested profile, it’s possible to also use a work profile managed by apps like Insular or Island. Private Space and work profiles are very similar, butPrivate Space has better OS integration and isolation, so Private Space is recommended by GrapheneOS over work profiles if possible.
A few app stores instead of GP
F-Droid:
1.Download from the official website.This will be used to download most of the recommended
apps
Obtanium:
2.Download from F-Droid. This will be used to download apps we cant find on F-Droid
Aurora Store:(Optional)
3 .Download from F-Droid. This is an privacy focused alternative to Googleplaystore. Only use if
necessary
